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In developed countries, social security covers workers 
and their dependents against old age, 
unemployment, health, and other risks. In 
developing countries, formal-sector workers have 
access to social insurance, and the very poor have 
some access to social assistance and health  
services, but large population groups are not 
covered. Extending social security coverage would 
require delinking social security benefits and labor-
market status; creating new institutions to cover 
currently excluded groups; financing these new 
programs through general taxation; improving tax 
collection; reducing the costs of formal-sector 
benefits; and increasing the costs of informal-sector 
benefits. 
Social security is defined in the European Union 
as social insurance and social assistance 
arrangements that protect the population against 
various economic risks. The U.K. definition, which 
includes cash benefits but excludes health services, 
and the U.S. definition, which includes only 
retirement benefits, are narrower. Social insurance 
denotes publicly provided or mandated contributory 
programs that cover workers and their dependents 
against major life risks—essentially unemployment, 
health risks, and old age. Beneficiaries receive 
income or services in exchange for contributions to 
an insurance scheme. Social assistance refers to 
noncontributory transfer programs that are means 
tested and targeted in some way to the poor or 
those vulnerable to poverty and shocks. Other policy 
instruments—in particular, progressive taxation and 
various regulations such as minimum wage laws and 
other labor market policies—help support social 
security. These instruments and their effectiveness 
should ideally be evaluated together with pension 
and health insurance systems and social safety net 
programs. 
Social insurance is a substitute for market 
mechanisms when such mechanisms are not 
economically viable or tend to exclude part of the 
population. It cannot operate like standard private 
insurance (where each participant pays a premium 
equal to the expected loss plus operating costs) and 
cannot be financed by actuarially fair contributions. 
Social security is thus partly financed through taxes 
levied on people irrespective of their exposure to the 
risks that are covered.
 It implies substantial income 
redistribution across individuals. It is mainly through 
that redistribution that the public coverage of old age 
and health risks is truly social (rather than an 
actuarially neutral substitute for the market 
mechanism).  
Social security has major social benefits, but it 
also has costs. Benefits arise from gains in efficiency 
and from a more harmonious and cohesive society. 
Costs arise from distortions generated on both the 
tax and the benefit sides, with additional distortions 
generated by non-insurance instruments (for 
example, by reducing the incentive to supply labor).  
Social Security in Developed Countries 
In developed countries, social security grew 
massively after World War II, in times of prosperity. 
In the past 30 years, many countries have 
introduced reforms in unemployment benefits and 
social assistance to re-establish individual incentives 
thought to be threatened by existing policies. Social 
security systems are complex and large—ranging 
from 31 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 
Sweden to 16 percent in the United States. 
Institutional differences between countries result 
from history and from differing views on the role of 
the private versus the public sector in insurable risks. 
Despite some significant direct and indirect costs, 
social security has generated enormous benefits in 
terms of income maintenance, poverty reduction, 
and economic stability. Cross-country studies of 
income redistribution that examine the coverage of 
low-income risks by government programs show that 
social security has helped reduce poverty drastically, 
by at least 40 percent in Europe—in heavily insured 
countries like Belgium and Sweden by more than 70 
percent—and by 28 percent in the United States. 
Table 1 shows the antipoverty impact of these 
programs in eight Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries. 
Pension Systems 
Pension systems in developed countries cover more 
than 90 percent of the labor force. All countries have 
a mandatory pension scheme, but the balance 
between voluntary and mandatory provision of 
pension benefits differs greatly. Voluntary private 
pension provision is widespread in countries such as 
Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 
which have relatively small mandatory pensions. In 
countries where a large share of income is replaced  
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Table 1—Antipoverty Effects of Government Spending in Selected Countries 
 
Share of Poor People by Income Source,  
in Selected OECD Countries 
Percentage Reduction in Poverty 
Country Market  Income 
Social Insurance 
(and Taxes)  Social assistance 
Social 
Insurance Overall 
Belgium  31.0 8.7 7.9  71.9  74.5 
Canada  24.8 13.8 11.9 44.4  52.0 
Finland  18.1 11.4  5.4 37.0  70.2 
Germany  28.6 9.9 8.2  65.4  71.3 
Netherlands  21.6 10.9  8.9 49.5  58.8 
Sweden  29.2 11.6  6.4 60.3  78.1 
United  States  23.7 19.3 17.0 18.6  28.3 
Average  26.1 13.6  9.8 46.9  61.8 
Source: Smeeding, “Government Programs and Social Outcomes: Comparison of the United States with Other Rich Nations,” in Public 
Policy and Income Distribution. A. Auerbach, D. Card, and J. Quigley, eds. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006). 
Notes: Poverty rates are for persons living in households with adjusted incomes below 50 percent of median adjusted disposable income. 
Market income includes earnings, income from investments, public- and private-sector occupations, pensions, child support, and other 
private transfers. Social insurances include the effect of taxes. Refunds from Earned Income Tax Credits (U.S.) and Family Tax Credit 
(U.K.) are treated as social assistance, as are near-cash benefits, such as food stamps and housing allowances. The percentage reduction 
in poverty is calculated as the market income rate minus the social insurance rate as a percentage of the market income rate. 
 
under the mandatory system, those covered have no 
need to make any voluntary provision for retirement. 
Various approaches are used to guarantee that all 
older people meet a minimum standard of living. 
OECD countries can be divided into several groups, 
depending on whether the link between pension 
entitlements and pre-retirement earnings is weak, 
strong, or nonexistent.  
•  In Canada, Denmark, Ireland, and New 
Zealand—where pension benefits are purely 
flat rate—there is almost no link between 
pension entitlements and pre-retirement 
earnings.  
•  In the United Kingdom and Australia, which 
have significant means-tested public 
schemes, as well as in Belgium and South 
Korea, the link between pension entitlements 
and pre-retirement earnings is weak. There 
are important minimum credits in the 
earnings-related pension plans of Belgium 
and the United Kingdom.  
•  Switzerland and the United States, which 
have progressive formulas in earnings-related 
schemes, and France and Japan, which have 
redistributive (minimum and targeted) 
programs, fall in between.  
•  In Finland, Italy, and the Netherlands the link 
between pension and pre-retirement 
earnings is very strong, and the replacement 
rate is constant for much of the earnings 
range.  
Pension systems also differ in the role that the 
public versus the private sector plays in pension 
provision. Where the link between pension and pre-
retirement earnings is strong in the mandatory 
system, voluntary private provision will have a  
greater role. In some countries, primarily in Latin 
America, the private sector is involved in running the 
mandatory pension system. The private sector also 
plays an important part in pension provision in 
several OECD countries. In the Netherlands, Sweden, 
and Switzerland, occupational pensions are 
mandatory or quasi-mandatory. When the United 
Kingdom allowed workers to “contract out” of the 
public, earnings-related scheme in 1978, 50–75 
percent of employees opted to substitute private for 
public provision. Sweden also recently introduced a 
mandatory defined-contribution scheme, while 
Denmark has a long-standing one. A defined-
contribution scheme is one in which a periodic 
contribution is prescribed and the benefits depend on 
the contribution plus the investment return (as 
opposed to a defined benefit scheme, in which a 
benefit based on a prescribed formula is 
guaranteed). 
Health Insurance  
With the exception of the United States, all 
developed countries now have universal health 
insurance. European health insurance systems offer 
the same services as market insurance but 
redistribute income by raising participants’ 
contributions in proportion to their income, although 
benefits are more or less equal. Health systems are 
classified as three types: (1) private finance plus 
private production/provision of services; (2) public 
funding plus public provision; or (3) public funding 
plus private provision plus stringent regulation of 
medical spending. Successful health care provision 
systems can be mainly public, mainly private, or 
mixed. There is no perfect model and each existing 
system has problems.
  
•  Public funding plus public provision, as in the 
United Kingdom and Scandinavia, has two 
strengths: its ability to contain costs and 
promote access. Its weaknesses include limits 
on consumer choice and sometimes long 
waits for service.  
•  Public funding plus private provision—for 
example, in Canada and Germany—scores 
well on access, consumer choice, and the 
absence of waiting lists, but not on the ability 
of doctors, clinics, and hospitals to contain 3 
costs; hence, it is vulnerable to upward 
pressures on medical spending. No country 
should consider this model unless 
policymakers are confident they have both the 
political and the administrative capacity to 
make the necessary cost-containment 
measures stick.  
•  The U.S. system, relying primarily on private 
funding plus private provision, suffers from 
coverage and cost problems. In the face of 
diverse and competing funding sources, third-
party incentives have not been contained, 
leading to a major cost explosion. Despite 
heavy public spending, gaps in coverage 
remain, and access to quality care is unequal.  
The key issue related to universal health 
coverage is how to maintain fiscal sustainability. 
Since medical expenditures are increasing rapidly, 
considerable effort is going into devising methods to 
contain medical spending in the face of third-party 
incentives—methods such as cost sharing, preferred 
providers, or mechanisms such as health 
maintenance organizations or diagnosis-related 
groups. Increasing cost recovery, with some 
exemptions for low-income persons, is equivalent to 
reducing the coverage of public health insurance 
schemes and offering more opportunities to private 
insurers. How much of that evolution is inherent in 
public health insurance systems and how much is 
due to the increase in the demand produced by rapid 
technological progress in the field or to the pressure 
of service producers has been debated for a long 
time. 
Unemployment Insurance  
Unemployment benefits decline as the length of 
unemployment increases. The replacement rate—
that is, the ratio of benefits to wages replaced by 
unemployment insurance—varies widely from 
country to country. The gross rate has fluctuated 
about 10–15 percent in the United States and Japan 
and 35 percent in France and the Scandinavian 
countries in the past 30 years. But the generosity of 
unemployment benefits has no significant impact, in 
the long run, on the level of GDP. Any negative 
effects of unemployment benefits on employment 
are fully offset by a net positive impact of 
unemployment benefits on productivity. 
Many people who are looking for work are not 
eligible for unemployment benefits, either because 
they are new entrants in the labor market or because 
they have exhausted their entitlement. In Greece, 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain, less than 25 percent of 
the unemployed receive benefits. The figure is higher 
in Germany (about 70 percent) and the Scandinavian 
countries. After a time, unemployed persons can 
receive social assistance payments (which are means 
tested and independent of past earnings), as 
opposed to unemployment benefits (which are paid 
for a limited period at a level linked to the wage 
earned in the previously held job). 
Unemployment benefit systems (as well as 
minimum income guarantee schemes) are 
predominantly financed through social insurance 
contributions on earnings in France and Germany 
and predominantly from taxes in the United 
Kingdom. Social assistance and other programs (for 
example, family allowances or housing subsidies) 
represent a smaller share of total social security than 
pensions and health care, but they generally provide 
highly effective coverage of families at risk, thanks to 
powerful targeting. However, such transfers have an 
efficiency cost because they reduce incentives for 
low-income recipients to find employment, and 
because raising taxes to finance income transfer 
programs may reduce incentives to work and save 
among the middle- and high-income earners who 
have to pay the extra taxes.  
Could Developing Countries Adopt  
the OECD Model? 
Since a strong demand for social security and better 
social protection for all workers exists in many 
emerging economies, policymakers are considering 
emulating the OECD model. The long-term goal is a 
universal system in which all citizens have access to 
an adequate and affordable level of health services 
and enjoy a decent pension—or at least a minimum 
income—in old age. Moreover, the services provided 
must be efficient and of decent quality across the 
entire income distribution. But is it possible for them 
to follow the model of developed countries? 
Developing countries differ structurally from 
developed countries in several respects: 
•  The per capita income level ($1,750 versus 
$35,000 on average) and the overall GDP 
share of social expenditures diverge greatly. 
For instance, developed countries spend 6.7 
percent of GDP on public health programs, 
compared with 2.8 percent in developing 
countries. Poverty levels are much higher, 
mean income levels are lower, and the 
distribution of income is in general much more 
unequal in developing countries. Labor 
markets are fragmented, and the informal 
sector is large. 
•  All countries, to varying degrees, devote 
public resources to health care, social 
assistance, and, for some privileged groups, 
pensions. But few developing countries have 
social insurance. Where it is available, 
coverage is limited to wage workers in the 
formal sector of the economy. 
•  Existing systems of social protection are 
fragmented. The richest population group has 
access to formal social insurance, and the 
very poor have some access to social 
assistance and health services. But large 
population groups are not covered by formal-
sector social security institutions and receive 
no social assistance.  4 
•  Redistribution of income is limited for all of 
these reasons: partial coverage, the limited 
size of social expenditures as a proportion of 
GDP, the concentration of benefits in 
privileged sectors, and the limited 
progressivity of social expenditures and the 
tax system. 
Developing countries are experiencing major 
difficulties in extending coverage to and raising 
contributions from nonpoor, informal-sector workers 
for several reasons: 
1.  Fiscal constraints. Universal social insurance 
requires a tax base and a level of general 
taxation above what is currently in place in 
most countries. Fiscal constraints are 
particularly strong in low-income countries in 
which public spending—averaging 15 percent 
of GDP—is about half of what it is in 
developed countries.  
2.  Administrative constraints. The most 
important is the lack of official records of 
income and therefore the difficulty of 
collecting taxes. Also, minimum income 
guarantees cannot be put in place if the 
government does not have the ability to test 
for means, in which case insurance against 
employment shocks or fluctuations in earnings 
must be provided through other channels. 
Another constraint is the potential for misuse 
of funds. Many programs suffer notoriously 
from graft, corruption, and capture by 
nonpoor beneficiaries. Basic accountability 
and keeping eligibility criteria and payment 
structures simple can help reduce fraud. 
3.  Incentive constraints and increasing 
informality. Social insurance produces several 
types of disincentives that affect the general 
efficiency of the economy. Though it does not 
increase unemployment, social insurance acts 
as a disincentive for people to stay in formal 
employment, contributing to the 
“informalization” of the economy. Evidence 
from Latin America and Eastern Europe 
confirms that social insurance increases the 
share of workers in the informal sector. 
Where enrollment is voluntary or only weakly 
enforced (which is the norm), many workers 
choose an informal labor contract rather than 
paying a higher (though subsidized) price in 
the public system or taking out private 
insurance. Even when enrollment is 
compulsory, incentives to pay social insurance 
contributions are low (as in Argentina, where 
a large number of workers do not pay their 
pension contributions). 
Minimum Pension Schemes in  
Developing Countries  
Whereas pension systems (including minimum 
pension schemes in developed countries) are 
strongly redistributive, yielding a sizable difference 
between poverty rates before and after transfer, they 
have limited potential for preventing old-age poverty 
in developing countries because of their low 
coverage. How can a basic income be provided to 
the elderly in developing countries? One option 
would be to open existing retirement systems to all, 
regardless of labor status, and provide a minimum 
income to all persons 65 and older. This is consistent 
with a social contract in which all citizens pool old-
age income risk. In addition to this risk-pooling 
component, the government might also want to 
provide incentives to working-age persons to achieve 
a higher old-age income through savings. This option 
would require that savings be voluntary, rather than 
mandatory, particularly since the income of a large 
group of nonsalaried workers is not observable.  
But moving to a unified, universal system would 
have a high fiscal cost. This option might also 
weaken incentives to work in the formal sector. 
Therefore, several governments have chosen a more 
efficient policy option: lump-sum transfers financed 
by tax receipts. These are pensions aimed at 
providing a replacement income to old persons under 
the poverty line. They are of two types. The first 
provides a minimum pension unconditionally to all 
the elderly. Benefits are the same for everyone 
regardless of income, assets, or work history. Only 
four developing countries have such arrangements: 
Bolivia, Botswana, Mauritius, and Namibia. They are 
easy to administer and do not require information on 
the income or assets of the beneficiaries. Except for 
Mauritius, the pension they offer is not high enough 
to lift its beneficiaries above the poverty line. The 
second type of minimum pension is also universal 
but subject to means testing. Five Latin American 
countries—Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, and 
Uruguay—have noncontributory pensions. These 
programs have a social assistance character in that 
they are targeted to the poor and disabled who 
cannot afford to contribute. In Brazil and Costa Rica, 
part of the social assistance pension benefit is 
financed by cross-subsidies from social insurance 
programs. Chile, Costa Rica, and Uruguay cover the 
greatest share, but Brazil has the largest number of 
beneficiaries—more than 8 million if the recently 
introduced rural pension programs are included. 
Rural pension programs provide a pension 
corresponding to the minimum wage to all men 
above 60 and women above 55 in rural areas. Some 
universal means-tested schemes apply to the 
household but not to the individual. The most 
famous example is the South African minimum 
pension. It is quite generous (one-third of per capita 
income), and it reaches 88 percent of the covered 
population. The pension is paid to men aged 65 and 
women aged 60 and over, and it is funded through 
general taxation.  
Several studies have examined minimum pension 
schemes. In rural Brazil and South Africa, 
noncontributory pension schemes were found to 
reduce both the rate of poverty for elderly people 
and the poverty gap. In Latin America, a study using 5 
survey data found that a hypothetical universal 
minimum pension would reduce poverty almost by 
half among the elderly in countries where poverty 
rates were higher. Universal schemes have much to 
commend them in terms of incentives, spillover 
effects, and administrative simplicity. However, their 
fiscal cost—which is a function of the dependency 
ratio and the fiscal capacity of the country—is far 
from negligible, even for low pensions. Given that 
the tax base is limited and tax revenue represents a 
small share of national income in developing 
countries, this policy option is probably not feasible 
for countries with a per capita GDP below, say, 
US$2,500 or US$3,000. Means testing is cheaper but 
less efficient in alleviating poverty. The net cost after 
subtracting existing transfers to the elderly—that is, 
means testing the minimum pension transfer—would 
be much smaller.  
Universal Health Insurance in  
Developing Countries 
Out-of-pocket health expenditures are often large, 
compared with income, and this limits access to 
services and pushes many households into poverty 
when health shocks occur. The challenge is to 
increase participation in risk-pooling schemes for two 
population groups: the poor, who will probably never 
be able to pay the average cost of a health benefits 
package, and high-risk individuals whose health costs 
will be higher than they can afford for much of their 
lives. 
Many countries have recently set up schemes for 
the poor, financing social health insurance 
membership out of general revenues.
 Most, however, 
typically commit substantial errors of exclusion, 
largely because poor households fail to apply. For 
instance, Colombia reformed its system in 1993, but 
10 years after, less than 50 percent of the principal 
target group was actually enrolled in the 
noncontributory scheme. In Vietnam in 2004, about 
40 percent of the poor who should have received 
health insurance coverage (or a free health care 
card) actually had done so. In the Philippines and 
China, evidence indicates that the “worst risks” are 
enrolling in rural social health insurance schemes.  
To extend coverage to informal and self-
employed workers—since participation in 
contributory health insurance is voluntary—the 
challenge is to find incentives for participation and to 
eliminate disincentives. Enforcing a mandate for 
participation in contributory schemes is almost 
impossible. There are four (not mutually exclusive) 
options: (1) facilitate participation of self-employed 
and informal workers through regulation;  
(2) improve enforcement of mandatory participation 
and evasion control; (3) increase means testing for 
access to publicly subsidized health services; and  
(4) reduce the gap between contributions and 
benefits by delinking risk-pooling financing from 
labor status, thereby shifting away from payroll 
taxes, reducing the costs of participation in 
contributory risk pooling, and increasing the 
perceived benefits of participation. Where subsidized 
national health services and contributory health 
insurance coexist, informal-sector households have 
alternatives and tend to move between the two 
systems. Thus, if a country decides to make the 
nonpoor contribute to risk-pooling coverage, it is 
essential to use means testing to determine access 
to subsidized care. 
General taxation is potentially the most efficient 
and equitable way to finance risk pooling—especially 
when employers and workers can evade payroll 
taxes. It depends, however, on the progressivity of 
tax collection mechanisms and subsequent public 
spending. By delinking financing from labor status 
and financing health coverage through general 
revenue—that is, through a broader tax base—health 
risks are effectively pooled across all taxpayers. This 
is the least regressive method and has the smallest 
transaction costs of all tax types (since society as a 
whole becomes a single pool). Moving to general 
taxation could also have a positive impact on the 
“formalization” of the labor market. 
General-tax financing does have disadvantages, 
however. For providers of public health services, the 
payroll tax is a more dependent and secure revenue 
source because it is more insulated from political 
budget discussions and, in general, less cyclical than 
general taxation. Payroll-tax financing creates a 
sense of entitlement so that governments may find it 
more difficult to cut health services or reduce the 
basic package of services offered. In developing 
countries, increasing general tax allocation to the 
health sector to replace payroll-tax financing will be 
difficult because tax collection capacity and “fiscal 
space” are limited. It will certainly prove difficult 
without governance improvements in existing social 
insurance systems. 
Policymakers have no financially sustainable 
options other than general tax financing and 
delinking coverage for nonpoor informal workers 
from the labor market. All other options have a high 
fiscal cost and perpetuate the deficit, meaning that 
contributions can never be enough to cover the cost 
of the benefits package. The only other alternatives 
are to reduce benefits (especially those that are 
perceived by workers as unlikely to be realized) or to 
introduce a voluntary premium to take into account 
the actuarial risk of the worker or household. From a 
purely risk-spreading perspective, this is the most 
efficient way of extending risk pooling to the 
nonpoor in the informal sector. It allows delinking of 
health coverage from labor status and makes 
portability of benefits easier.  
Moving toward Universal Social Security  
Moving toward more universal forms of social 
security in developing countries would require that 
countries take the following steps: 
•  Increase financing from general taxation. This 
would decouple social security from labor-
market status. When coverage is based on 6 
residence (or citizenship), not on labor-market 
status, the distinction between a formal and 
informal worker becomes irrelevant. This 
option has been implemented in many OECD 
countries.  
•  Improve revenue collection capacity and more 
effectively sanction tax avoidance. This would 
expand the tax base so that the system could 
be financed from general taxation as much as 
possible. By reducing payroll taxes, this option 
increases demand for labor and is thus 
potentially job creating and efficiency 
increasing. Of course, the transition has to be 
carefully planned to provide incentives to 
workers to join contributory risk-pooling 
schemes and to foster incrementally the use 
of general taxation to replace these 
contributions over time. All these are 
important institutional and political challenges.  
•  Create new programs and institutions to cover 
population groups excluded from existing 
social security arrangements. Up-front costs 
are lower, but this approach runs the risk of 
fragmenting the social security system, which 
would limit risk pooling, forgo economies of 
scale, be prone to pressure from interest 
groups to expand benefits in a fiscally 
irresponsible or inequitable way, face 
coordination problems, and hamper portability 
and transferability of benefits.  
Two often-contradictory goals, expanding 
coverage and maintaining incentives for formality, 
have to be taken into account when designing new 
programs. In providing social insurance to informal 
workers, it is important to avoid giving workers 
incentives to be informal. In other words, the 
benefits provided should hit the antipoverty target 
without being more generous than formal-sector 
benefits. Portability of benefits across institutions is 
also required so that workers can move between 
jobs without losing coverage. A number of additional 
reforms would be desirable: at least for a segment of 
the population, increasing subsidies from general 
taxation; improving “value for money” and the 
quality of services so that more workers would be 
willing to pay for social protection; reducing the costs 
of formality imposed by rigid labor laws (since this 
reduces the cost of accessing social security); and 
unbundling health and pension benefits to better 
align the system with workers’ preferences. Recent 
reforms in several middle-income developing 
countries have often been based on some 
combination of the above policies, which are 
complementary.  
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